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“Without a vision, the people die.” (Proverbs 19:28) 
“I don’t believe any more than Spinoza did in the utility of denouncing vice, evil, 
and sin. Why always accuse, why always condemn? That’s a sad ethic indeed, for 
a sad people.” (Andre Comte-Sponville, A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues)1 
“[S]uccess is distant and unlikely, so it’s helpful to have a taste for noble failure 
and for the camaraderie of the angry few.” (Larissa MacFarquhar, Strangers 
Drowning)2 
 
1. Silence and Pessimism 
John Haldane describes Alasdair MacIntyre as “the foremost philosophical witness to and 
interpreter of our conflicted contemporary condition.”3 For almost seven decades, MacIntyre has 
been a voice crying out in the desert, calling moral philosophy—calling broader academia, calling 
“modernity”—to a richer, more coherent, better-grounded worldview, a latter-day Aristotelianism 
redeemed by Aquinas and given a countercultural, cutting edge by Marx. 
In good Aristotelian form, MacIntyre has long proclaimed that moral formation is central to 
human flourishing and that the best moral education comes from living in a good polis. A good 
community fosters, intentionally and confidently, the inherent moral capacities of its members, 
helping them to become increasingly adept practical deliberators and to cultivate the moral virtues 
tantamount to the living of a worthy human life. 
A broadly sympathetic university-level ethics teacher might wonder what practical advice, for 
her particular vocation, emerges from a careful reading of MacIntyre’s subtle, historically and 
sociologically informed, virtue-oriented thinking. How, if she takes MacIntyre’s near-
septuagenarian corpus seriously, should her ethics courses be taught? What positive roles might a 
gentle-as-a-dove, shrewd-as-a-serpent professor sensibly and responsibly aim to play in the moral 
formation of her college students? 
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This earnest teacher might find herself, if she takes much of what she reads to heart, dispirited. 
She could feel left in the lurch. As commentators remark, it’s often easier to discern what 
MacIntyre is against than what he is for. Though MacIntyre provides rich, detailed descriptions of 
being apprenticed into various practices,4 he generally neglects to theorize about the good 
classroom. MacIntyre’s “bleak diagnoses of the pathologies” of modern life get most of the ink, 
along with meticulous historical explanations of our culture’s devolution into unprecedented 
ethical fragmentation.5 Proposals concerning university-level ethics pedagogy, and other 
conceivable constructive cultural counterpoises, seem to get short shrift. 
Cultural pessimism saturates MacIntyre’s corpus. As James Bernard Murphy puts it, 
“MacIntyre’s famous opening of After Virtue invites us to imagine our contemporary moral life as 
a post-apocalyptic nightmare in which formerly integral traditions of moral practice and thought 
have been exploded into mere shards of genuine practices.”6 Simply put, modern society isn’t a 
good polis. Instead of a training ground for eudaimonia, our contemporary institutions are 
dominated, MacIntyre thinks, by the “ethics-of-the-market” and the “ethics-of-the-state,” cultural 
forces geared to making us into avid consumers and compliant “citizens.” Moral growth requires 
becoming an incisive, substantive critic of your own desires; corporations prefer you not question 
your hankerings for glimmery and techy things. 
In this temper, MacIntyre is often bluntly negative about university-level ethics curricula. One 
might have predicted that MacIntyre, typically a gleeful critic of the modern technocrat, has 
pathologized today’s educational assessment tools and their sterile vocabulary. Instead, he 
seemingly puts his trust in them: “we have no good reason to believe that the teaching of ethics 
through academic courses can be effective in bring about moral transformations.”7 More, 
MacIntyre often construes the classroom itself as nothing more than an “instrument” of the 
prevailing, inimical forces: “the moral content of our educational system is simply a reflection of 
the moral content of our society.”8 Perhaps MacIntyre’s deep-running cultural pessimism explains 
his pedagogical silence: why speak about “the good classroom” if it is not, in this present darkness, 
a possible reality? 
MacIntyre occasionally speaks more positively about “the teacher,” which might be 
encouraging. However, he’s called her “the forlorn hope of the western world.”9 Given that 
“forlorn” connotes a sadness-tinged hopelessness, this ersatz encomium—the teacher as the 
“hopeless hope” of the western world—isn’t ultimately much consolation.  
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What’s our earnest ethics professor to do? 
 
2. How to Respond? 
A few possible reactions come to mind. 
Our earnest educator might choose to soldier on. Camus praises Sisyphus as an “absurd hero” 
for endlessly pushing his rock up the mountain despite his lucid recognition that absolutely nothing 
will ever come of it.10 Likewise, a willful teacher might resolve to labor on absurdly, shaking her 
fists scornfully at the inexorable forces of society, in heroic defiance of her fate—and perhaps 
cultivating a “taste for noble failure” and “the camaraderie of the angry few.”11 
Or, our sincere educator might choose to withdraw, as Rod Dreher encourages, into a 
community—a “Benedict Option” commune, as it were—that attempts to socialize its members, 
intentionally and confidently, from childhood, partly by sheltering them from, partly by 
combatting the influence of, the forces inimical to their moral formation.12 Or, following Stanley 
Fish’s counsel in Save the World on Your Own Time,13 she might choose henceforth to “aim low,” 
staying put in the university system, but eschewing her heartfelt vocation, and newly treating her 
role as a teacher as nothing more than a “job,” which she must complete adequately to warrant her 
salary.14 Or, in a different stroke of boldness, our teacher might shrug her shoulders, decide her 
quest for the holy grail of pedagogical advice from MacIntyre was a misdirected enquiry, double 
down on her fulsome vocation, and turn MacIntyre’s “negativity” into a hearty joke, perhaps by 
placing an ironic placard above the threshold of her Introduction to Ethics classroom: “Abandon 
all hope, ye who enter here.” 
MacIntyre himself has sometimes prescribed that teachers, while resolutely upholding a 
“Utopian” ideal in their own hearts, take the willful, heroic, defiant, rock-pushing, Sisyphean 
course.15 This seems telling: revolutionary moral zeal and cultural pessimism surge deep within 
MacIntyre’s philosophical veins. 
 
3. My Approach 
As an ethics professor myself, I find it natural to consider where, within these rival, incompatible 
positions, to stand. Loath to treat the teacher-student relationship as merely transactional, I simply 
can’t go with Fish. Even if the best learning outcomes aren’t of world-historical significance, 
everyday teaching sends profound signals to students; aiming low communicates that sustained 
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ethical reflection isn’t useful or important. (Talk about rank capitulation to prevailing forces.16) 
Good teachers, I trust, can find ways to talk—or to shrewdly nudge—many students into forms of 
moral reflection conducive to personal growth and better ethical decisions. 
I also have no intention to plunk for the Benedict option. I’m going to keep my current job. 
When choosing a proper pedagogical approach, context matters, of course. I happen to teach at a 
small liberal arts college in the Holy Cross Catholic tradition, a college which includes “fostering 
knowledge of the Catholic tradition” among its learning outcomes for core philosophy courses. 
This means I’m not only licensed but expected to engage the Christian moral traditional in the 
classroom. That said, slightly more than half of my university’s student body identifies as Catholic. 
Is my classroom, then, a “half-Benedict” situation? “Quarter-Benedict”? 
As for the Sisyphean mentality, I’m strongly averse to seeing myself in such grandiose terms. 
I’m not against fighting a good fight when the prospects of success are modest to low, but in my 
view an attitude of heroic defiance not only ignores the substantial goods a thoughtful teacher can 
facilitate, it threatens to mutate into self-importance and self-pity.17 In comparison, the jestful 
strategy strikes me as wiser. 
In this essay, I intend to steer a steady course between a forlorn, rock-pushing mentality and 
the jester’s choice. Like the persevering jester, I’m simply less pessimistic about both modernity 
and ethics instruction than MacIntyre. (My mentality is closer, perhaps, to Charles Taylor’s. 
Taylor, himself troubled by this secular age’s vices and foibles, simultaneously regards modernity 
as replete with half-understood virtues and spiritual seeking.18) A thoughtfully constructed ethics 
course cannot be all things to all students: 45 contact hours over the course of 15 weeks isn’t, I 
agree, an apprenticeship. But it can be quite a few things to quite a few people. 
Unlike the jesting strategy, though, I won’t treat critical engagement with MacIntyre as a 
“misdirected enquiry.” I agree with so much: among other things, MacIntyre’s desire for ethics 
pedagogy to cut to the philosophical, existential bone; the corresponding prominence of his 
“utopian” streak; his emphasis on sociological self-knowledge; and his appeal to the value of 
narrative and imagination to moral transformation. 
I’ve struggled to put my finger on what, precisely, I disagree with MacIntyre about. My sense 
is: MacIntyre’s utopianism can feel, too often, like a cudgel. Elsewhere, I’ve argued for the 
theoretical, moral, and pedagogical value of “big picture,” “unattainable” moral ideals, such as the 
biblical commandment to love neighbor as self.19 One of my basic principles, the foundation of a 
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pedagogical strategy, reflects the quotations from Proverbs and from Comte-Sponville at the 
beginning of this essay: students are more likely to struggle—for forty years in the desert, as it 
were—if they vividly, imaginatively recognize what they are struggling for. MacIntyre doesn’t 
really do aspiration. When he speaks of his utopian ideals, it’s often to note how far short of glory 
our society has fallen. Start with MacIntyre’s bluntly negative appraisal of contemporary ethics 
courses, add his remark that “we need a Utopian concept of the curriculum […] in order to provide 
an instructive measure of achievement,”20 and his can seem a sad ethics, indeed. 
 
4. Stage Setting 
As I read MacIntyre, I find myself continuously asking, but uncertain how to answer, at least three 
broad, highly salient questions about how to interpret his thinking about ethics education. 
The first: What does MacIntyre take “students these days” to be like? Of course, a good teacher 
needs to know her subject matter—in this case, what counts, broadly speaking, as (less than) 
exemplary ethical reasoning. She also needs to know her audience.21 To discern good pedagogical 
strategies, it’s helpful to have significant insight into what her students’ particular needs, mental 
habits, and aspirations are, as well as what “epistemological framework and evaluative standards” 
they often think and act from.22 
The contemporary college student isn’t a character that populates MacIntyre’s philosophical 
prose—except, of course, as yet another creature addled by modernity. Rich accounts of the moral 
lives of contemporary teens and young adults do exist. In a 2001 profile of high achieving Ivy 
League students,23 the journalist David Brooks describes his regular encounters with the 
“organization kid” (OK), a student who is affable, tolerant, hard-working, highly scheduled, smart, 
and career-oriented, but whom he finds somewhat troubling. For all her undeniable virtues, the 
OK is also deferential to authority to the point of conformist, as well as “blinkered” in the sense 
of being absorbed in her own life and significantly unaware of what’s happening in the broader 
world. Most notably, this sort of student lacks a “robust ethical vocabulary.” When moral questions 
arise, the affable OKs—skittish about giving offense—change the subject. When they do reflect 
upon the ethical trajectory of their lives, OKs speak in terms of their hopes for future “love, 
success, and happiness,” not with robust concepts such as justice, mercy, and humility. 
In his extensive, qualitative research, the sociologist Christian Smith paints a strikingly similar 
picture of many American teenagers and young adults.24 Whatever their academic credentials and 
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work habits, many contemporary U.S. teenagers and young adults are, in an important sense, 
“moralists.” In a faint allusion to moral traditions such as Aristotle’s, they accept that “central to 
living a good and happy life is being a good, moral person.” In their sensibility, this means being 
nice, pleasant, tolerant, respectful, and responsible. It’s important, they believe, to work hard to 
make something of oneself. Fluent in many subjects, these teens and young adults are, similar to 
the OKs, notably inarticulate about ethical (and religious) topics. 
Though “kids these days” are not all of a piece, and new cultural trends are emerging,25 Brooks 
and Smith present a fairly accurate picture of many of the second- to fourth-year students who take 
my ethics courses. A salient question—for me, and I suspect for many other teachers—is how best 
to engage such a student? How strong are the prospects, if we show a bit of insight and ingenuity, 
for helping these particular people grow? What—from within their mentality—can we as teachers 
intelligently and responsibly use as leverage? 
My second interpretive question: How does MacIntyre conceive of university-level ethics 
pedagogy? MacIntyre is critical of contemporary ethics courses, but he doesn’t overtly describe 
them. A highly plausible guess is that, since MacIntyre thinks the modern university to be—
infelicitously—an instrument of the prevailing ethos within modernity, “Morality,” he presumably 
supposes ethics courses reflect the broad contours of this complicated mindset. 
MacIntyre generally presents Morality—or “the morality system”—as an “unwieldy product of 
modern social and ideological changes, given intellectual standing by three centuries of unwitting 
theorists.”26 Morality is presented as a set of impersonal rules or maxims that, e.g., prohibit the 
violation of moral rights and require a degree of truthfulness, tolerance, and altruistic benevolence. 
Morality treats these norms as rules to which any rational agent whatsoever ought to give assent. 
Within the morality system, there are competing answers to the question why these norms deserve 
universal assent. There’s the Kantian idea, grounded in a fundamental commitment to human 
equality and dignity, that obedience to such maxims by others is something that as rational agents 
we cannot but will, and so consistency requires that we also take those maxims to govern our own 
actions. The utilitarian answer, grounded in fundamental commitments to impartiality and 
benevolence, is that compliance with such maxims maximizes society-wide well-being or 
happiness or utility. A contractualist answer is that these maxims represent social expectations it’s 
reasonable for us to foist on others and for others to foist on us.27 
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Extrapolating from this, a Morality-based ethics course would describe utilitarianism, 
Kantianism or some other form of “deontology,” and social contractarianism, perhaps with a few 
classes also devoted to talking about the merits and demerits of ethical relativism. These theories 
might subsequently be applied to case studies or to culturally contentious ethical questions. The 
student might be asked not only to describe and apply the competing theories, but to reflect on 
which theory she finds most sanguine. The course likely ends, literally and philosophically, there. 
For the sake of ease, let’s call this the “standard” ethics course.28 
Fish applauds the standard course. MacIntyre is peeved by it, for principled reasons. First, such 
a course is historically and sociologically mute, and so doesn’t compel a student to interrogate the 
ethical environment she inhabits.29 Second, it is blithely monistic in its philosophical mindset. 
Utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractarianism, and relativism take the complexity of morality, with 
the many distinct values morality promotes and protects, and attempt to boil this complexity down 
into a theory with a single, fundamental value: human dignity or utility or deference to prevailing 
cultural codes. In doing so, Morality “does not illuminate the particularities, textures, and valences 
of moral […] considerations as we experience them.”30 In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, 
among other places, MacIntyre implicitly raises a third objection to the standard course: he calls 
for forms of moral socialization that treat students not merely as brains that need to think a bit 
more clearly, but as persons for whom narrative can have transformative value. On these three 
points, I agree fully with MacIntyre. 
As a confession, I have occasionally taught the standard course. At the very beginning of my 
career, I did so ham-fistedly, but I grew past it in pursuit of pedagogy philosophically, rhetorically, 
and psychologically more subtle. More recently, when I taught in an international context and 
couldn’t anticipate what my students would be like, I followed a Fishier syllabus that “aimed 
lower.” (That decision continues to seem sensible to me.) 
My third and final interpretive question concerns the “depth” of MacIntyre’s cultural 
pessimism, though I don’t know how to put the question very precisely. Just “how strong”—how 
causally powerful, how determinative—does he take the forces of global capitalism and political 
liberalism to be? Do these forces make moral growth impossible for most anyone, not merely for 
students within the contemporary university system? On the flipside, just how strong is 
MacIntyre’s “it takes a polis” thesis? Of course, people have never lived in perfect moral 
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communities, and yet some people do seem—even today—to live worthy human lives. I certainly 
have students who strike me as morally committed and thoughtful. 
There are elements of MacIntyre’s thinking that could mitigate his pessimism about the 
prospects of ethics pedagogy. MacIntyre’s brand of Aristotelianism is made “neo” partly by his 
belief that “the ways in which human capacities can be realized are diverse and that the range of 
considerations relevant to human flourishing [are] also variable.”31 The idea is that, though human 
flourishing always requires the cardinal moral virtues, eudaimonia can manifest in otherwise 
strikingly different human lives and contexts. This pluralistic commitment makes MacIntyre less 
elitist than Aristotle himself. And given that it posits multiple paths to a well-lived life, it would 
seem to be grounds for greater hope. I wonder why this idea doesn’t seem to qualify MacIntyre’s 
bluntly negative commentary on ethics teaching. 
MacIntyre’s answers to my three broad questions form the backdrop for his assessments of 
contemporary ethics instruction, but it’s not always easy to know what his answers are. From time 
to time, I will simply need to hope I haven’t misinterpreted him. 
 
5. A Critical Analysis of MacIntyre on University Education 
In a broadly admiring but ultimately sharply critical appraisal of MacIntyre’s thinking about 
contemporary university education, Murphy describes the ambient mood of MacIntyre’s writing 
as “quixotic pessimism,” which strikes me as spot on. MacIntyre’s thoughts on university 
education form more of a “collage” than an integrated philosophy of education.32 But there are 
notable themes alongside his neo-Aristotelian Thomist philosophical and ethical convictions, his 
Marxist analysis of our contemporary economic situation, and his emphasis upon our culture’s 
fragmented moral vocabulary. 
First and foremost, there’s MacIntyre’s idiosyncratic form of idealism. Committed to the liberal 
arts, ethics teachers generally express high aspirations for student learning and development. In 
Murphy’s view, though, MacIntyre is not merely a garden-variety idealist; he’s a “resolute 
moralist,” and in two important senses. First, his reflections on education are dominated by a desire 
that the university be an instrument of revolutionary social and moral reform.33 Second, MacIntyre 
sometimes seems to set the bar exceedingly high for counting as having a properly virtuous 
sensibility. The Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who seems to have lived a highly 
admirable life, apparently fails to measure up, on the grounds she didn’t adequately scrutinize the 
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fundamental—and fundamentally decent—moral and political commitments she assiduously and 
effectively devoted her life to.34 No doubt, authentic moral formation, a process of socialization 
much broader than schooling, includes the transformation of desire and an increased talent at 
consistently making good choices.35 Does living virtuously require morally unassailable 
foundations? Does it require being able to articulate, with philosophical sophistication, why they 
are? Such exacting intelligence strikes me as a profound strength, but not a necessity for moral 
goodness. 
What, we might wonder, are the pedagogical implications of MacIntyre’s high-minded, 
sometimes intellectualist, revolutionary moralism? Let’s say an ethics teacher succeeds in helping 
several OKs become considerably more comfortable speaking up about moral questions. Or in 
helping a student inarticulate about justice approach fluency in the complex, specialized language 
of moral rights. Or let’s say her student, initially committed to a vaguely conceived conception of 
tolerance, comes to recognize, first, that tolerance is a “limited virtue”—there are times when a 
tolerant person should choose, not to forbear, but to act out—and, second, that he must adopt a 
broad, coherent moral outlook if he is going to decide judiciously where the relevant line is to be 
drawn. Even though these advances don’t revolutionize society, and they don’t guarantee fully-
fledged practical wisdom in the relevant student, these seem to be small, hard-won victories. 
Would MacIntyre deny their value? 
MacIntyre’s quixoticism sometimes manifests as a penchant for diminishing the value of his 
own relatively modest, but sensible practical advice. This raises important questions: for example, 
whether a teacher’s primary focus should be on changing society or, instead, on fostering the 
inherent moral capacities of her students. The answer seems obvious. And it seems as though it 
should be clear to MacIntyre, too, given that the second part of what “makes his Aristotelianism 
‘neo’” is Aquinas’s correction of Aristotle that “progress toward good judgment and rightly 
directed desire is often partial and uneven, so that someone who exemplifies them admirably in 
some area […] may fail miserably […] in some other area.”36 When a teacher facilitates partial 
moral progress, it is progress, and it is consequential, as it disposes the student to make 
substantively better ethical decisions and to form stronger personal relationships. 
In any case, in Murphy’s final analysis, quixotic pessimism is precisely what you would 
experience if you were to adopt MacIntyre’s blend of revolutionary idealism, with its 
uncompromising, intellectualist standards, and his deep-going cultural pessimism. This sensibility 
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leads—inexorably—to “burden[ing] schooling with impossible expectations and then wonder[ing] 
why we are always so disappointed.”37 
 
6. MacIntyre and the Irrelevance of Ethics 
Murphy’s 2013 analysis of MacIntyre is strongly confirmed by a close reading of MacIntyre’s 
2015 essay, “The Irrelevance of Ethics.” All of the elements of MacIntyre’s quixotic temperament 
are starkly present: the deep-in-the-bloodstream cultural pessimism and anti-modernist spirit; the 
forlorn, “utopian” moralism; and the penchant to diminish the value of his own (sensible) 
proposals. These are joined, I might add, by gestures at a “we-know-not-what” socioeconomic 
world that would be meaningfully better than ours (and would not simply trade one set of human, 
foible-filled institutions for another). 
In “The Irrelevance of Ethics,” MacIntyre’s skepticism about the efficacy of university-level 
ethics courses is especially brusque and dismissive. When an ethics scandal rocks the financial or 
political world, there is invariably a public outcry: “Bring on the ethicists! Make students take 
more ethics courses!” MacIntyre responds, paraphrased: “Don’t bother.” MacIntyre’s specific 
target in his essay, though, is university-level business ethics. MacIntyre judges such courses “at 
best” distractions from what truly matters, an investigation “into the nature and causes of what is 
flawed in our economic institutions and activities.”38 His more robust conclusion is that business 
ethics courses, and the business schools that require them, unwittingly send their fledgling 
graduates unawares into the fowler’s snare: “the financial sector as a whole” is “a school of bad 
character,”39 for which a B+ in a standard ethics course imparts to graduates a false sense of ethical 
security. 
In MacIntyre’s judgment, business ethics instructors proceed—mistakenly—as though their 
students can have both moral and financial success. In reality, they confront an existential choice 
between their souls and their wallets: “we may measure ourselves and our activities by the 
standards of wisdom and temperateness, [that is,] by the standards of virtue, or by the standards of 
money, but we cannot do both. We have to choose between them.”40 
To illustrate, MacIntyre asks his reader to compare the mental habits of a morally virtuous 
person and a “successful” financial trader. First, consider four, interrelated moral virtues. A good 
person has a “tempered [Socratic] realism” about herself; she won’t overestimate her powers or 
think she knows what she does not know. Her just estimation of herself disposes her to judge risks 
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with a clear and judicious mind. With courage, she acts neither rashly nor cowardly in the face of 
true risks. More, if the common good truly calls for it, she will put skin in the game; it’s not an act 
of courage to risk other people’s hides. In good Aristotelian form, MacIntyre ends by commenting 
on the morally virtuous person’s disposition to see her life as a whole. Accordingly, she will not 
be guilty of ungrounded “time biases,” such as giving up her own soul for the piece of bread that 
will sate only this quarter’s hunger. 
MacIntyre presents the successful financial trader—successful by “the standards of money”—
in glaring contrast. Confronting the complexity of the market, a sensible person will not think, nor 
insinuate, she knows its future.41 However, the financial trader needs to project self-confidence so 
as to earn and keep the trust of clients. In other words, he “can’t afford” to be properly self-
questioning or self-doubting. Also, a good financial trader shifts risks away from himself; he 
doesn’t put more skin in the game than strategically necessary. A good financial trader, one who 
plays by the rules of the trading world, need not be a thorough-going egoist, but he will be a “group 
chauvinist” who favors the interests of self, company, and shareholder, a pursuit which does not 
demand sensitivity to the common good. He will also accede to a “time bias,” namely, the 
prevailing demand to meet short-term earning goals. In sum, for the successful financial trader to 
take on the project of becoming morally virtuous would, MacIntyre contends, create an 
“insuperable disadvantage” to his continued professional success. Without argument, MacIntyre 
judges it’s legitimate to extrapolate to other business professions; within our economy, virtue and 
mammon don’t mix. 
In MacIntyre’s judgment, this unhappy reality needs to be directly confronted, and the 
pedagogy of business ethics isn’t up to the task. The spirit of standard business ethics courses is 
severally misguided: first, it presumes a falsely benign view of the global market; second, it 
operates with a crimped conception of moral obligation, supposing moral goodness doesn’t 
demand “training in desire” or a robust devotion to the common good. So long as an accountant 
or store manager obeys legal restrictions and various moral side constraints, he’s done his duty. 
What, according to MacIntyre, should be done about all this? At times, MacIntyre’s 
prescriptions are vague and defeatist. Sounding more resigned than heroically defiant, MacIntyre 
writes, “the most we can hope to do is […] understand the limitations of our present moral and 
intellectual condition, and then ask how we can best live and act in that condition.”42 At other 
points, MacIntyre gestures at specific but relatively modest proposals. A blithe market 
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triumphalism—with its “all boats, rising tides” aphorisms— dangerously pervades the thinking of 
some business students. Business faculty would do well to highlight, not merely the social benefits 
of a market economy, but the morally serious costs. Also, MacIntyre notes a common fallacy: 
ordinary non-philosophical people, whether inside or outside of the business world, often infer, 
from a fancy title or a well-tailored suit, that the bearer must be an admirable person. A good ethics 
course could challenge such deference to wealth, which permits the wolves of Wall Street to hide 
in plain sight. Very thoughtfully, MacIntyre alludes to a form of profound confusion ordinary non-
philosophical people often feel. For the manufacturing class whose jobs have gone overseas, the 
global market—a force which gives, and a force which takes away—is a “Great Big 
Incomprehensible.”43 Against a disciplinary tendency to conceive of economic factors as 
impersonal forces, MacIntyre claims economic networks are human constructs and are built by 
human decisions. If that truth is recognized, it becomes possible to reconstrue market relationships 
and activities in moral terms, even in the language of moral virtue. It is people who ship people’s 
jobs overseas; “when,” business faculty should get in the habit of asking, “are their deliberations 
proper?” 
These strike me as excellent suggestions. There are many others. Ethics courses that ask 
students to reflect on the moral limits of markets44 and nudge them to distrust the manufactured 
neologisms of corporations and politicians, and ethics courses that raise the question what type of 
moral character, and what type of personal habits, it takes to be a whistleblower—these, too, strike 
me as worthwhile. These are conversations that will prime some graduates to gird up against the 
fowler’s snares to come. 
In “The Irrelevance of Ethics,” MacIntyre’s penchant for pulling the carpet from under his own 
counsel emerges. The essay ends on an infelicitous note: “ethics will once again become relevant” 
only when principles “very different from those of either a wholly free market economy or of the 
state-and-market economies of present day Europe” are ascendant.45 Until society is profoundly 
reformed—MacIntyre’s word choices suggest—our thinking will be so hopelessly fragmented that 
we won’t be able to think in ways that are “relevant.”  
In this context, MacIntyre gestures at a better socioeconomic world. But he doesn’t say much 
about what it would be like, beyond that it would be a realm in which “thinking about virtues and 
thinking about money” would be “reconnected.” MacIntyre needn’t be so quaint as to proclaim 
that this new economic reality would flow with milk and honey, but his vision of what “Should 
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Be” threatens to become—even for the sympathetic, inquiring, earnest ethics instructor—yet 
another “Great Big Incomprehensible.” MacIntyre hasn’t given her much sense of what moral 
vision she is to teach towards. 
 
7. A Few Curiosities 
Some, seeing greater virtue in the liberal state and the market economy, will be put off by 
MacIntyre’s Marxist critique. I’m not much of a market triumphalist, but I can’t say, when I work 
to improve my students’ marketable skills, I’m doing so only because of my job description. I’m 
happy to enhance their writing and communications skills so they’ll come to write better memos 
and conduct smarter, tighter meetings—a too rare skill. In any case, in this section I will note 
several other contestable elements of MacIntyre’s arguments. 
First, a question about MacIntyre’s own argumentative strategy. MacIntyre tells us he devotes 
Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity to the “plain nonphilosophical person,” a character who 
emerges in the book’s second sentence.46 MacIntyre subsequently sets up a dialectic that 
presumably leads this person from the (naïve realism of) Morality to expressivism, and then from 
(anti- or quasi-realist) expressivism to his ultimate conclusion, an Aristotelian form of critical 
realism. As usual in MacIntyre’s philosophizing, the way a person is able, reasonably, to choose 
between “incompatible rival positions” is to find what questions a particular tradition of thought 
raises but can’t itself answer. The “better” tradition is superior because it’s able to explain, 
powerfully, why the competing tradition can’t move beyond its inherent lacunas. MacIntyre 
ultimately expresses confidence that ordinary reflective people, at least those who earnest consider 
how they should live, are “covert Aristotelians.”47 Their best convictions and practices implicitly 
commit them to this type of critical realism.48 
Curiously, if a teacher were to follow MacIntyre’s (quasi-Hegelian) script, elements of the 
standard ethics course would be necessary, not irrelevant: a vital propaedeutic, at least within 
modernity, to his neo-Aristotelianism. MacIntyre’s expressivist-style critique of Morality can’t get 
off the ground if his readers are unfamiliar with the basic elements of the mindset being critiqued. 
Accordingly, MacIntyre himself should cry out, “Bring on the ethicists!” 
More curiously yet, MacIntyre, in drawing his battle lines so starkly, seems to embody a 
strikingly un-ecumenical spirit. To begin with, won’t utilitarians and Kantians find themselves 
rather surprised that they’re mere instruments of the ethics-of-the-market? Such thinkers might 
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remark that MacIntyre’s own moral critique of the primary causes of the 2008 global financial 
collapse are often deeply consistent with elements of Morality. A Kantian will point out that fine 
print and subprime loans do not treat customers with dignity. Further, a blinkered focus on self, 
company, and shareholders and a fixation on short-term gains over long-term fiscal viability don’t 
square with the long-term, pragmatic, impartial heart of utilitarian thinking. Only emasculated 
forms of these theories, forms of Kantianism and utilitarianism that go totally mute at selective 
points, will serve so blithely as tools in the hands of global capitalism. This raises the question 
whether MacIntyre is guilty of treating half-allies as complete enemies. The morally virtuous 
person in Thomist thinking, lacking Morality’s “monistic” disposition, isn’t a thorough-going 
utilitarian or a pure Kantian. But she will care intensely about the moral values at the foundations 
of utilitarianism and Kantianism, namely, impartiality, benevolence, and human dignity. So, why 
tilt at useful windmills? 
Put pedagogically, our earnest ethics teacher might have guessed that if our cultural climate is 
fragmented, some of the bits and pieces might serve as small, Archimedean rocks, from which we 
might leverage students to better views. To treat Kantianism and utilitarianism as mere enemies is 
not only philosophically charitable, it cuts off a more positive, constructive pedagogical approach. 
If the Brooks-Smith image of “kids these days” is true of a significant number of college students, 
they’re already committed to values such as tolerance, equality, respect for human dignity, and 
benevolence. When my own students read Brooks, they intuitively sense that the OKs are “good 
people” in whom “something is missing.” Naturally, some of these students begin to wonder 
whether they, too, lack a “robust ethical vocabulary” and a broad, underlying moral sensibility 
geared to helping them discern, among other things, when (not) to exercise tolerance. They begin 
to wonder, too, whether they have grasped the real-life, possibly life-altering implications of a 
serious, consistent commitment to equality, moral rights, and benevolent concern.  
 
8. Teaching as Stratified, Personal, Utopian Nudging 
MacIntyre hasn’t explicitly prescribed that teachers openly betray an attitude of quixotic 
pessimism to their students. And he doesn’t overtly claim university professors must treat the 
central dialectic of Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity as the central script for ethics curriculum. 
(Does MacIntyre imply it should be, though, when he prescribes, rather narrowly, “certain 
novels”—by Oscar Wilde and D. H. Lawrence—as necessary for any “serious” ethics course?) 
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Even so, let’s consider how cut-down-to-the-bone, “utopian” ethics courses could be taught more 
optimistically and constructively. If we’d like a course that asks students to confront profound 
existential choices and taps positively into moral imagination, what form might it take? 
No doubt, there’s more than one possibility. One option is to follow Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s 
proposal to give pride of place, in our moral theorizing and in moral education, to moral 
exemplars.49 From a young age, much moral development occurs through the imitation of virtuous 
models: a caring mother, a thoughtful teacher, a good coach. Despite this, philosophical treatments 
of ethics have often paid little attention to theorizing about people who are morally admirable and 
whose exemplary traits motivate others to emulate them; the utilitarian, Kantian, and social 
contract traditions do not emphasize this idea. This common oversight prompts Zagzebski to 
present a competing theory that “serves the same purpose as deontological, consequentialist, and 
virtue theories.”50 Her “exemplarist” view defines the meaning of a wide range of moral concepts 
in terms of traits we admire in exemplars. As Zagzebski points out, one pedagogical advantage of 
her theory is that there is wider agreement about who counts as an exemplar than about which 
particular moral values—utility or dignity, say—should be given the greatest priority within 
practical deliberation. Reflection on moral exemplars naturally privileges narrative.51 And 
Zagzebski’s (plausible) hope is that a student’s admiration will have the power to create a yearning 
to emulate goodness.  
Another possibility is to follow the lead of ethics teachers who structure courses in the spirit of 
much ancient Greek philosophy, with its Socratic emphasis on the question, “How ought I to live?” 
Such a course might ask students to imagine themselves, trenchantly, into the mental and moral 
lives of Epicureans, Stoics, Socrates himself, Aristotelians, various medieval thinkers such as 
Augustine and Aquinas, or broad-minded, humanistic contemporary thinkers. This idea reminds 
me of the book Five Great Philosophies of Life,52 originally titled From Epicurus to Christ, by 
William DeWitt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College from 1885–1917. The book, whose pages 
are occasionally spotted by unhappy elements of its early-twentieth century sensibility, has several 
redeeming pedagogical virtues. For example, DeWitt Hyde skillfully picks out Epicurean and Stoic 
themes in the best poetry and literature of his day, which enriches his argument and helps his 
readers feel the (continued) compelling force of some ideas at the heart of these “ancient” 
philosophies. For a second virtue, DeWitt Hyde’s book, with philosophical charity, constructively 
“builds” towards a broad, coherent ethical outlook. DeWitt Hyde makes a point of drawing positive 
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and compelling lessons from each worldview he ultimately critiques. As he constructs a subtle 
picture of a way of life—a Christian worldview with strong marks of New England 
Protestantism—he finds an important place for such lessons. Alongside somewhat dated 
prescriptions, there’s considerable wisdom; and in a philosophy class, DeWitt Hyde’s 
controversial conclusions can themselves be substantively critiqued. In my view, it can be very 
powerful for students, even students strongly averse to a book’s ultimate conclusions, to witness 
what it looks like for an incisive thinker to sketch a broad picture of the moral life. It helps them 
to envision how having a coherent, reflectively grounded worldview can answer questions they 
themselves confront in the run of life. This approach is, I think, one significant antidote to what 
ails the affable, tolerant, respectful OKs who mumble about ethics. 
 
9. A Puzzling Phenomenon and My Own Pedagogic Practice 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Sigmund Freud argues it’s a very bad idea for a person to strive 
to live up to, and for a society to prescribe for its citizens, the biblical commandment “love your 
neighbor as yourself.”53 If a reader happens to enjoy the tweaking of an old piety, she’s likely to 
find Freud’s arguments, which have a relentless, pithy, streetwise charisma, great fun. Freud 
argues that striving to love every “inhabitant of the earth” equally and intensely would come at 
serious, unrequited personal costs. It would, predictably: anger your friends and family, who 
justifiably expect you to love them more than strangers; “stretch you thin” emotionally; and, worse, 
imprudently leave you susceptible, when you turn the other cheek, to being twice bruised. Given 
his pessimistic view of human nature, and so his belief that most of our “neighbors” are “aggressive 
creatures” not given to love, Freud predicts you’ll fail—miserably, in both outcome and mood—
to live up to the principle, which will eventually make you resentful of morality and its 
unreasonable demands. In its stead, for you and for society, Freud prescribes a principle of tit-for-
tat reciprocity, “do unto others as they (intend to) do to you,” which he finds more self-protective 
and so more reasonable. 
When students in my college-level ethics course are confronted with “Freud against neighbor 
love,” many publicly express agreement with him, at least initially. By this point in my career, I 
know their “yeah, he’s rights” are coming; but their response repeatedly surprises me. Many of the 
very same students who nod at Freud’s punchy arguments also describe themselves as Christians. 
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One might have guessed such students would dig in their convictional heels. Instead, they give off 
the impression of capitulating to Freud’s acidic cynicism. 
After eliciting the students’ first reactions, the classroom dialectic continues. We tease out 
Freud’s assumptions and begin to raise objections to his arguments and to the underlying 
worldview that gives rise to them. As it turns out, the case against Freud against neighbor love is 
fairly strong, and almost as punchy. Freud’s arguments lack balance: he neglects to put his own 
tit-for-tat principle under the type of scrutiny he subjects neighbor love to; he doesn’t contend with 
any of neighbor love’s sharper, more sophisticated advocates. He’s often (demonstrably) guilty of 
misconstruing what agape is, and he ignores—or implausibly denies—its positive effects, personal 
and social. Freud also operates with a strikingly narrow conception of the purpose of morality, and 
so he fails to recognize the theoretical and moral value of “unattainable” moral ideals such as “love 
neighbor as self.” 
Once these objections are laid out, many students—predictably—express that they ultimately 
disagree with Freud’s reasoning. In the span of two or three classes, something akin to a quorum 
of young scholars swings, pendulously, from being seemingly oblivious to a Freud-style critique 
to being pro-Freud to being anti-Freud. 
The general trajectory of this classroom discussion of Freud is one example of a familiar 
experience I have in teaching philosophy. Pendular swings are common. If you frame a debate by 
asking certain questions, you can prompt students to express one set of convictions. If you ask 
certain other questions, you can prompt them to deny, implicitly or explicitly, the very same 
convictions. This is true, I find, when classroom discussion turns to relativism, to the question 
whether we all have a moral right to our own beliefs, and so on. Fragmentation, indeed. What 
explains these swings? 
A few explanations come to mind. The one I tend to favor is that (many) students are highly 
impressionable. The students in my ethics courses are—similar to the students described by Brooks 
and Smith—often earnest, respectful, and, by perfectly sensible standards, bright. Many give the 
strong impression they take their schooling, if not invariably their broader education, very 
seriously. And if we accept the analysis I’ve favored, perhaps the students’ willingness to change 
their minds reflects a measure of intellectual virtue, or at least the absence of a particular 
intellectual vice: a petty, reactionary, partisan close-mindedness to new arguments. That said, my 
students’ rapid-fire philosophical waffling raises hard questions for me as a teacher. It makes me 
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worry that, among other things, they’re highly susceptible to being pushed around, not only by 
well-meaning teachers who gently suggest sensible conclusions, but by advertisers, managers, and 
demagogues, whose intentions aren’t so civic. When I think of what a strong graduate of a liberal 
arts education is like, I imagine her to be open-minded, but not credulous and easily manipulated. 
I’m with MacIntyre here: an ideal graduate has developed a strong sense of who she is, with a 
developing, well-grounded sensibility, one that helps her to be resolute when she confronts ideas 
that oppose her most commendable underlying convictions. How to help a student begin to find 
her convictional bearings? And how to do so in a responsible manner?54 
The standard ethics course doesn’t do this. Aspiring to do better, I’ve taken to structuring my 
“Ethics and the Good Life” syllabus in accordance with the DeWitt-Hyde-like argumentative arc 
of a more recent book. In A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues, the French moral philosopher 
Andre Comte-Sponville construes the principle “love neighbor as self” as a profound “summary” 
of the entirety of “the moral law.” He understands the moral life to be, at its very best, an attempt 
to strive to become more and more agapic: in his view, agape is an unswerving, heartfelt 
commitment to a form of justice seasoned by generosity and mercy. Comte-Sponville is an atheist 
in terms of his metaphysic, but deeply invested in the New Testament—as well as Aristotle, Pascal, 
Spinoza, and Kant—in terms of his conception of morality. Sponville’s agapic picture of morality 
is crucial to his understanding of moral virtues such as tolerance, courage, fidelity, justice, and 
generosity, each of which he calls “a feeble approximation of love.” 
In my course, we talk about many topics independently of Sponville, but over the semester the 
course “builds,” partly by following a trajectory that reflects Sponville’s “hierarchy” of moral 
virtues, from chapters about “less exalted” moral virtues such as tolerance, to greater moral virtues 
such as justice and generosity. Comte-Sponville’s book is rhetorically rich, substantive, chock full 
of smaller insights. It is also replete with metaphors and digressions. Not all teachers will find his 
somewhat messy, digressive style right for them.55 Sponville’s broad argument and his overarching 
agapic commitments are also, in our contemporary environment, controversial. But we don’t let 
Comte-Sponville off the hook. One reason we read Freud is to think through his “punchy” 
objections to neighbor love. What Comte-Sponville, similar to DeWitt Hyde, does well is construct 
a “big picture” conception of the moral life that is geared up to help any devotee make (better) 
quotidian decisions. It also self-consciously paints the moral virtues in an attractive light.  
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10. Concluding Remarks 
Scholastic education, MacIntyre is correct, is superficial in comparison to a lengthy process of 
apprenticeship. Moreover, some college students simply aren’t prepared for cut-to-the-bone 
reflection. In other words, no ethics course can be all things to all people. But a well-constructed 
course, working at “different levels,” can be quite a few things to quite a few students. In my 
“Ethics and the Good Life” course, ordinary learning outcomes are certainly met. All students have 
the opportunity to improve their writing skills; their critical thinking skills, by tangling with 
arguments about topics such as relativism, tolerance, and moral rights; and their interpretive skills, 
partly by fighting through, with guidance, Comte-Sponville’s metaphor- and digression-rich style.  
For the students who have ears to hear, “Ethics and the Good Life” intimates greater things. It 
consistently asks them to scrutinize their ethical environment and to confront their self-reported 
“value commitments.” They are asked to consider whether their commitments to tolerance and 
respect for humanity compel them to contextualize these virtues within a broader moral outlook. 
Over the course of the semester, Comte-Sponville, among others, models sustained, worldview-
oriented ethical reflection.  
In the final analysis, Comte-Sponville turns out to be a “utopian realist,” an idealist in terms of 
his moral vision, generally unimpressed with human moral character. MacIntyre’s cudgel is 
present, for Comte-Sponville also employs the moral virtues as “instructive measurements of 
achievement.”56 A clear conception of justice and of generosity, he remarks, will tell us how unjust 
and ungenerous we generally are.57 However, Comte-Sponville also sounds other, more 
aspirational notes. Gentle, shrewd,58 incisive, historically-informed, book-length reflection upon 
moral virtue can draw many ordinary people upwards—in his view, towards neighbor love and 
towards the relationships neighbor love makes possible. Not such a sad ethics.  
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